

베어링자산운용

의결권 행사 세부지침

1. 개요

베어링자산운용 (이하 “회사”)의 의결권 행사 세부지침 (이하 “본 지침”)은 회사의 “의결권 행사 규정 및 절차”에 따라 회사의 집합투자재산 (투자신탁 및 투자회사)에서 보유한 주식을 발행한 법인에 대한 의결권을 행사함에 있어, 그 행사의 방법에 대한 세부적인 지침을 정함을 목적으로 한다.

본 지침은 “의결권 행사 규정 및 절차”에서 정하지 아니한 세부적인 사항을 정하기 위함이며, 본 지침이 회사의 “의결권 행사 규정 및 절차”와 상치하는 경우에는 “의결권 행사 규정 및 절차”를 우선적으로 준수하여야 한다.

2. 의결권 행사 대상 법인

회사의 집합투자재산에 보유한 주식 중 다음의 주식을 발행한 법인에 대해서는 반드시 의결권을 행사하고 공시한다.

1) 자본시장법 상 의무 공시 대상 :

- 각 집합투자기구 자산총액의 100 분의 5 이상을 보유하고 있는 주식을 발행한 법인; 또는
- 각 집합투자기구 자산총액의 100 억원 이상을 보유하고 있는 주식을 발행한 법인

2) 회사가 상당한 지분을 보유 :

- 회사의 집합투자재산 및 투자일임재산 전체 합으로 발행주식 수의 5% 이상을 보유하고 있는 주식을 발행한 법인
- 회사의 집합투자재산 전체 합으로 100 억원 이상 또는 발행주식 수의 1% 이상을 보유하고 있는 주식을 발행한 법인

3) 기타 회사의 판단 :

- 주식운용팀의 판단에 따라 회사의 집합투자재산 및 투자일임재산의 고객의 이익을 위하여 적극적인 의결권 행사가 필요하다고 판단된 주식을 발행한 법인

3. 의결권 행사 가이드라인

회사는 “의결권 행사 규정 및 절차” 제 13 조에 정하는 바와 같이, 독립적인 외부 리서치 제공자 (의결권에 행사에 대한 리서치를 제공하는 자)의 추천에 따라 의결권을 행사하는 것을 원칙으로 한다.

단, 회사의 판단에 따라 외부 리서치 제공자의 추천을 따르지 않는 것이 고객의 이익에 부합하다고 판단되는 경우 “의결권 행사 규정 및 절차” 제 15 조에서 정한 절차에 따라야 한다. (주식운용팀은 회사의 의결권행사위원회 (이하 “위원회”)에 해당 안전에 대해 외부 리서치 제공자의 추천을 따르지 않는 사유를 제시하고 위원회의 승인을 득함)

회사에 리서치를 제공하는 자의 의결권행사 가이드라인은 별첨 1)과 같다. 해당 가이드라인은 외부 리서치 제공자의 검토에 따라 갱신될수 있으며, 본 지침의 별첨 1)은 이에 따라 갱신된다.

회사는 외부 리서치 제공자가 별첨 1)의 가이드라인을 준수하여 회사에 의결권 행사 방향에 대한 추천 및 리서치를 제공한다고 판단한다. 따라서, 외부 리서치 제공사의 추천 및 리서치가 별첨 1)의 가이드라인을 준수하였는지 여부에 대해 회사가 별도 모니터링을 실시하지 않는다.

별첨 1) 외부 리서치 제공자의 의결권 행사 가이드라인

Overview

In South Korea, an ordinary general meeting of shareholders must be convened at least once a year at a fixed date (the Commercial Act, Article 365). The general shareholders meeting date is determined within three months to the record date. Companies must give public notice two weeks prior to the general shareholders meeting date, provided otherwise designated by the articles of incorporation (the Commercial Act, Article 354).

Pursuant to the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (Article 159-1), all listed companies must submit its business report to the Financial Services Commission and an exchange within 90 days of the closing of each business year. As the business report must contain financial statements approved by the shareholders, companies hold their annual general shareholders meeting before the submission deadline.

Most Korean companies set the last day of December as the record date, which is also the typical ending date of the fiscal year. As such, companies generally hold AGMs in February and March, with extreme meeting concentration in the month of March to meet regulatory requirements.

In particular, the Amendment of Article of Incorporation proposals are always presented in a bundled manner. As such, in cases where the negative provisions proposed in a resolution outweigh any positive ones, vote against the whole resolution. Shareholders are advised to carefully scrutinize any changes to a company's articles as shareholders will not likely have any chance in the future to reverse the amendments once the amended articles are in place.

The following are frequently proposed amendments to the Article of Incorporation in Korea:

Cumulative voting

Establishment of Audit Committee

Adjustment of Par Value

Issuance (limit) on new shares or convertible securities

Increase in authorized capital

Stock split

Reverse stock split

Preferred stock / Non-voting common shares

Stock Option Grants

Stock Option Program for the Employee Stock Ownership Plan

Diversification / Expansion of Business Objectives

Amend Quorum Requirements

Authorizing board to approve financial statements and income allocation

Golden Parachute Clause

1. Operational Items

Approval of Financial Statements and Statutory Reports

General Recommendation: Generally vote for the approval of financial statements, report of board of directors, supervisors, and independent directors and other statutory reports unless there are concerns about the accounts presented or audit procedures used.

Allocation of Income

General Recommendation: Generally vote for the approval of allocation of income (and declaration of cash or stock dividends), unless:

- The dividend payout ratio has been consistently low without adequate justification;
- The payout is excessive given the company's financial position;

2. Board of Directors

Korean law imposes two different sets of corporate governance standards on listed companies – one for companies whose asset size is greater than KRW 2 trillion (large companies) and the other for companies whose asset size is below KRW 2 trillion (small companies). Under Korean law, large company boards must have a majority of outside directors, and small companies are required to have a board on which one-fourth of the directors are outsiders.

Four fundamental principles apply when determining votes on director nominees:

Independence: Boards should be sufficiently independent from management (and significant shareholders) to ensure that they are able and motivated to effectively supervise management's performance for the benefit of all shareholders, including in setting and monitoring the execution of corporate strategy, with appropriate use of shareholder capital, and in setting and monitoring executive compensation programs that support that strategy. The chair of the board should ideally be an independent director, and all boards should have an independent leadership position or a similar role in order to help provide appropriate counterbalance to executive management, as well as having sufficiently independent committees that focus on key governance concerns such as audit, compensation, and nomination of directors.

Composition: Companies should ensure that directors add value to the board through their specific skills and expertise and by having sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. Boards should be of a size appropriate to accommodate diversity, expertise, and independence, while ensuring active and collaborative participation by all members. Boards should be sufficiently diverse to ensure consideration of a wide range of perspectives.

Responsiveness: Directors should respond to investor input, such as that expressed through significant opposition to management proposals, significant support for shareholder proposals (whether binding or non-binding), and tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered.

Accountability: Boards should be sufficiently accountable to shareholders, including through transparency of the company's governance practices and regular board elections, by the provision of sufficient information for shareholders to be able to assess directors and board composition, and through the ability of shareholders to remove directors.

Election of Director

General Recommendation: Generally vote for re/election of directors, except under the following circumstances:

Independence

Vote against non-independent director nominees (Executive Directors and Non-Independent Non-Executive Directors per ISS Classification of Directors) when

- Independent directors comprise less than majority of the board in the case of large companies, or less than 25 percent in the case of small companies.

Classification of Director

Executive Director

- Employee or executive of the company or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company;
- Any director who is classified as a non-executive, but receives salary, fees, bonus, and/or other benefits that are in line with the highest-paid executives of the company.

Non-Independent Non-Executive Director (NED)

- Any director who is attested by the board to be a non-independent NED;
- Any director specifically designated as a representative of a shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is also an employee or executive of a significant[1] shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is also an employee or executive of a subsidiary, associate, joint venture, or company that is affiliated with a significant[1] shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is nominated by a dissenting significant shareholder, unless there is a clear lack of material[2]
- connection with the dissident, either currently or historically;
- Beneficial owner (direct or indirect) of at least 5 percent of the company's stock, either in economic terms or in voting rights (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a defined group, e.g., family members who beneficially own less than 5 percent individually, but collectively own more than 5 percent), unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold (and in other special market-specific circumstances);
- Government representative;
- Currently provides or has provided (or a relative[3] provides) professional services[4] to the company, to an affiliate of the company, or to an individual officer of the company or of one of its affiliates in the past three years in excess of USD 10,000 per year;
- Represents customer, supplier, creditor, banker, or other entity with which the company maintains transactional/commercial relationship (unless company discloses information to apply a materiality test[5]);
- Any director who has a conflicting relationship with the company, including but not limited to cross-directorships with executive directors or the chairman of the company;
- Relative[3] of a current employee or executive of the company or its affiliates;
- Relative[3] of a former employee or executive of the company or its affiliates;
- A new appointee elected other than by a formal process through the General Meeting (such as a contractual appointment by a substantial shareholder);

- Founder/co-founder/member of founding family but not currently an employee or executive;
- Former employee or executive (five-year cooling off period);
- Years of service is generally not a determining factor unless it is recommended best practice in a market and/or in extreme circumstances, in which case it may be considered.[6]
- Any additional relationship or principle considered to compromise independence under local corporate governance best practice guidance.

Independent NED

- No material^[2] connection, either directly or indirectly, to the company (other than a board seat) or the dissenting significant shareholder.

Employee Representative

- Represents employees or employee shareholders of the company (classified as “employee representative” but considered a non-independent NED).

Footnotes:

[1] At least 5 percent of the company's stock, unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold.

[2] For purposes of ISS' director independence classification, “material” will be defined as a standard of relationship financial, personal, or otherwise that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one's objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual's ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

[3] “Relative” follows the definition of “immediate family members” which covers spouses, parents, children, stepparents, step- children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.

[4] Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature and generally include the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; and legal services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transaction (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship.

[5] A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding transactions) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is equivalent to either 1 percent of the company's turnover or 1 percent of the turnover of the company or organization with which the director is associated. OR, A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding financing operations) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is more than 10 percent of the company's shareholder equity or the transaction value, (of all outstanding financing operations), compared to the company's total assets, is more than 5 percent.

[6] For example, in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, directors with a tenure exceeding nine years will be considered non- independent, unless the company provides sufficient and clear justification that the director is independent despite his long tenure.

Composition

Attendance: Generally vote against an outside director who attended less than 75 percent of board and key committee meetings over the most recent fiscal year, without a satisfactory explanation. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following:

- Medical issues/illness;
- Family emergencies;
- The director has served on the board for less than a year; and
- Missing only one meeting (when the total of all meetings is three or fewer).

Overboarded Outside Directors: Generally vote against an outside director who sits on more than two public company boards, in violation of the Commercial Act and accompanying presidential decree;

Where adequate disclosure has been provided, generally vote for the election of a CEO, managing director, executive chairman, or founder whose removal from the board would be expected to have a material negative impact on shareholder value.

Board Gender Diversity: Generally vote against the chair of the nomination committee (or other senior members of the nomination committee on a case-by-case basis) up for election if the company is non-compliant with the board gender diversity regulation.

In making any of the above recommendations on the election of directors, ISS generally will not recommend against the election of a CEO, managing director, executive chairman, or founder whose removal from the board would be expected to have a material negative impact on shareholder value.

Accountability

Climate Accountability:

For companies that are significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, through their operations or value chain¹, generally vote against the responsible incumbent director(s), or any other appropriate item(s) in cases where ISS determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps needed to understand, assess, and mitigate risks related to climate change to the company and the larger economy.

Minimum steps to understand and mitigate those risks are considered to be the following. Both minimum criteria will be required to be in alignment with the policy:

- Detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including:
 - Board governance measures;
 - Corporate strategy;
 - Risk management analyses; and
 - Metrics and targets.
- Appropriate GHG emissions reduction targets.

At this time, “appropriate GHG emissions reductions targets” will be medium-term GHG reduction targets or Net Zero-by-2050 GHG reduction targets for a company's operations (Scope 1) and electricity use (Scope 2). Targets should cover the vast majority of the company's direct emissions.

Governance Failures:

Vote against the election of director if adequate disclosure has not been provided in a timely manner.

Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against individual directors, members of committees, or the entire board, due to:

- Material failure² of governance, stewardship, risk oversight, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;
- Failure to replace management or directors as appropriate; or

¹ Companies defined as “significant GHG emitters” will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list.

² Examples of material failure of governance include but are not limited to: indictment or conviction for embezzlement; bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; poor risk oversight of environmental and social issues, including climate change; significant adverse legal judgments or settlement; or hedging of company stock.

- Egregious actions³ related to a director's service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his/her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

Generally vote against directors from all boards on which the individual serves for failure to remove a director from the board who has demonstrated a serious failure of accountability due to his/her egregious actions.

For cases where the election of multiple directors is presented as a bundled item, vote against the entire slate of directors if one of the nominees presents any of the governance concerns highlighted above.

Voting on Director Nominees in Contested Elections

General Recommendation: ISS will make its recommendation on a case-by-case basis, determining which directors are best suited to add value for shareholders.

The analysis will generally be based on, but not limited to, the following major decision factors:

- Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry;
- Management's track record;
- Background to the contested election;
- Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements;
- Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of the critique against management;
- Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and
- Stock ownership positions.

When analyzing a contested election of directors, ISS will generally focus on two central questions: (1) Have the dissidents proved that board change is warranted? And (2) if so, are the dissident board nominees likely to effect positive change (i.e., maximize long-term shareholder value).

Discharge of Director

General Recommendation: Generally vote for the discharge of directors, including members of the management board and/or supervisory board, unless there is reliable information about significant and compelling controversies as to whether the board is fulfilling its fiduciary duties, as evidenced by:

- A lack of oversight or actions by board members that invoke shareholder distrust related to malfeasance or poor supervision, such as operating in private or company interest rather than in shareholder interest; or
- Any legal proceedings (either civil or criminal) aiming to hold the board responsible for breach of trust in the past or related to currently alleged actions yet to be confirmed (and not only the fiscal year in question), such as price fixing, insider trading, bribery, fraud, and other illegal actions; or
- Other egregious governance issues where shareholders will bring legal action against the company or its directors.

³ Egregious actions encompass broader situations that include but are not limited to material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight, or fiduciary responsibilities. Examples of egregious actions include felony-level offenses that called for indictment or conviction, and the failure to remove such problematic director from the board. Typically, an individual's action deemed egregious is viewed as a more severe case which prohibits the individual from assuming a director seat on the board of any company.

Board Structure

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to fix board size:

- Vote against the introduction of classified boards and mandatory retirement ages for directors.
- Vote against proposals to alter board structure or size in the context of a fight for control of the company or the board.

Cumulative Voting

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to introduce a provision that will prohibit the use of cumulative voting in director elections.

3. Audit-Related

Under Korean law, large companies are required to establish an audit committee comprising a minimum of three members, two-thirds of whom should be outside directors (including the chair). Korean law also requires that at least one audit committee member possess accounting or related financial management expertise or experience.

Election of Audit Committee Member(s)

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of audit committee members. Consider the history of a particular director when deciding whether to vote in favor of his/her (re)election.

Examples of circumstances where a vote against an audit committee member's (re)election should be considered include:

- There are serious concerns about the statutory reports presented or audit procedures used;
- A director has had significant involvement with a failed company;
- A director has in the past appeared not to have acted in the best interests of all shareholders;
- A director has breached fiduciary duties or engaged in willful misconduct or gross negligence in his/her capacity as a director (irrespective of whether such wrongdoing brings claims of losses and/or damages to the company);
- A director has been indicted by the Prosecutors' Office and there are pending investigations;
- An outside director has attended less than 75 percent of board meetings in the most recent financial year, without a satisfactory explanation;
- An outside director sits on more than two public company boards, in violation of the Commercial Act and accompanying presidential decree;
- A non-independent director (under ISS classification) seeks to become an audit committee member (for large companies);
- A non-independent director (under ISS classification) seeks to become an audit committee member and the audit committee is less than two-thirds independent (for small companies);
- A director has engaged in some significant transactions with the company and affiliates in the last three years and he/she cannot reasonably be seen to have the necessary objectivity and independence; or
- Other questions exist concerning any of the audit committee members being appointed.

Election of Internal Auditor(s)

Under Korean law, small companies are required to appoint at least one internal auditor. These companies may alternatively choose to establish an audit committee.

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of internal auditor(s). Consider the history of a particular internal auditor when deciding whether to vote in favor of his or her (re)election.

Examples of circumstances where a vote against an internal auditor's (re)appointment should be considered include:

- There are serious concerns about the statutory reports presented or audit procedures used;
- The internal auditor(s) has previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company;
- A nominee has had significant involvement with a failed company;
- A nominee has breached fiduciary duties or engaged in willful misconduct or gross negligence in his/her capacity as an internal auditor (irrespective of whether such wrongdoing brings claims of losses and damages to the company);
- A nominee has been indicted by the Prosecutor's Office and there are pending investigations;
- A nominee has engaged in some significant transactions with the company and affiliates in the last three years and he/she cannot reasonably be seen to have the necessary objectivity and independence; or
- Other questions exist concerning any of the internal auditors being appointed.

For those small companies which choose to create an audit committee in place of the internal auditor system vote for the election of an inside director as an audit committee member only if the company's audit committee, after the election, satisfies the legal requirement.

Establishment of Audit Committee(s)

General Recommendation: Generally vote for the establishment of an audit committee as a replacement for the internal auditor system.

4. Capital Structure

Capital

Adjustment of Par Value

General Recommendation: Vote for requests to adjust the par value of common stock unless the action is being taken to facilitate an anti-takeover device or some other negative corporate governance action.

Issuance (limit) on new shares or convertible securities

General Recommendation: Vote for issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 20 percent of currently issued capital.

The most contentious aspect in this proposal pertains to articles that permit companies to issue new shares, convertible bonds, and/or bonds with warrants without triggering existing shareholders' preemptive rights. Only vote for these article amendments if:

- The potential dilution ratio to existing shareholders does not exceed 20 percent; and
- The proposed issuance limit of new shares is set at no higher than 20 percent of issued shares.

Increase in authorized capital

General Recommendation: Generally vote for increases in authorized capital, unless:

- The increase in authorized capital exceeds 100 percent of the current authorized capital without any justification; or
- The increase in the authorized capital results in less than 30 percent of the proposed authorized capital on issue.

Stock split

General Recommendation: Generally vote for stock splits or reverse stock splits unless there is potential dilution impact on existing shareholders as a result of stock split and/or reverse stock split.

Reverse stock split

General Recommendation: Vote for a reverse stock split if:

- The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or
- The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Increase in Authorized Capital policy.

Preferred stock / Non-voting common shares

General Recommendation: Generally vote for the creation of a new class of preferred stock, or the issuance of preferred stock up to 50 percent of the issued capital, unless the terms of the preferred stock would adversely affect the rights of existing shareholders.

Restructuring

Spin-off agreement

General Recommendation: Generally vote for the approval of a spinoff agreement, unless:

- The impact on earnings or voting rights for one class of shareholders is disproportionate to the relative contributions of the group;
- The company's structure following the spinoff does not reflect good corporate governance;
- There are concerns over the process of negotiation that may have had an adverse impact on the valuation of the terms of the offer; and/or

- The company does not provide sufficient information upon request to make an informed voting decision.
- There is an accompanying reduction in capital.

Reduction in capital

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to reduce capital for routine accounting purposes unless the terms are unfavorable to shareholders.

Reduction in capital accompanied by cash consideration

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to reduce a company's capital that accompany return of funds to shareholders and are part of a capital-management strategy and an alternative to a buyback or a special dividend. Such a resolution is normally implemented proportionately against all outstanding capital, and therefore do not involve any material change relative to shareholder value.

Reduction in capital not accompanied by cash consideration

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to reduce capital that do not involve any funds being returned to shareholders. A company may take this action if its net assets are in danger of falling below the aggregate of its liabilities and its stated capital. Such proposals are considered to be routine accounting measures.

Merger agreement, sales/acquisition of company assets, and formation of holding company

General Recommendation: Generally vote for the approval of a sale of company assets, merger agreement, and/or formation of a holding company, unless:

- The impact on earnings or voting rights for one class of shareholders is disproportionate to the relative contributions of the group;
- The company's structure following such transactions does not reflect good corporate governance;
- There are concerns over the process of negotiation that may have had an adverse impact on the valuation of the terms of the offer;
- The company does not provide sufficient information upon request to make an informed voting decision; and/or
- The proposed buyback price carries a significant premium at the date of writing, conferring on shareholders a trading opportunity.

Discussion

The company-level transactions that require shareholders' approval include: sale/acquisition of a company's assets or business unit; merger agreements; and formation of a holding company. For every analysis, ISS reviews publicly available information as of the date of the report and evaluates the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors.

Valuation – Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, ISS places emphasis on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale.

In Korea, under the Capital Market and Financial Investment Business Act (CMFIB), a fairness opinion is not required for companies with listed shares because the Act specifically sets out all relevant steps and the manner in which the proportion of shares should be divided between the acquirer and target. The CMFIB requires the stock swap ratio between listed companies to be determined by a specific formula which is based on the historical prices and trading volumes.

For transactions between an unlisted company and a listed company, a fairness opinion should be obtained from the independent advisers who review the fairness of the stock swap ratio and the compliance with the governing laws and regulations.

Market reaction – How has the market responded to the proposed deal? How did the company's stock price react following the announcement compared to those of its peers? A negative market reaction will cause ISS to scrutinize a deal more closely.

Strategic rationale – Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions.

Conflicts of interest – Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-inside shareholders? ISS will consider whether any special interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger.

Governance – Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.

Trading opportunity from the dissident's right – Does the proposed buyback price carry a premium or confer on shareholders a trading opportunity?

In Korea, the Corporate Act entitles shareholders to exercise a dissident's right (also known as a right of withdrawal, appraisal right, or buyback right) when the company resolves to engage in such transactions as a sale/acquisition of business, merger, or formation of a holding company.

A dissident's right is the right of shareholders to have their shares bought back by the company at a pre-determined buyback price in the event that shareholders dissent with management on a proposed merger. The manner in which the share buyback price is determined is stipulated under Korean law.

ISS considers whether the proposed buyback price carries a significant premium as of the date of analysis and states in the analysis whether the proposed buyback price confers on shareholders a trading opportunity at the time of analysis. However, shareholders who are interested in exercising the right of withdrawal are advised to reevaluate the size of premium/discount attached to the proposed buyback price, if any, closer to the meeting date and ensure that a written notice of intention of dissent is submitted well in advance of the general meeting.

5. Compensation

Remuneration Cap for Directors

General Recommendation: Generally vote for approval of the remuneration cap for directors, unless:

- The proposed cap on directors' remuneration is excessive relative to peer companies' remuneration without reasonable justification; or
- The company is asking for an increase in the remuneration cap where the company has not provided a reasonable justification for the proposed increase.

Remuneration Cap for Auditors

General Recommendation: Generally vote for the remuneration cap for internal auditors, unless:

- The proposed remuneration cap for internal auditors is excessive relative to peer companies' remuneration caps without reasonable justification; or
- The company is asking for an increase in the remuneration cap where the company has not provided a reasonable justification for the proposed increase; or
- There are serious concerns about the statutory reports presented or audit procedures used.

Stock Option Grants

General Recommendation: Generally vote for a proposed stock option grant, unless:

- The maximum dilution level under the plan exceeds 5 percent of issued capital for a mature company; or
- The maximum dilution level under the plan exceeds 10 percent for a growth company.

Amendments to Terms of Severance Payments to Executives

General Recommendation: Generally vote for the establishment of, or amendments, to executives' severance payment terms, unless:

- The company fails to provide any information in regard to the changes to the terms of severance payments to executives;
- The negative provisions proposed in a resolution outweigh any positive ones; and/or
- The company proposes to introduce a new clause that is effectively a golden parachute clause.

Stock Option Programs for the Employee Stock Ownership Plan

General Recommendation: Generally vote for article amendments to establish stock option programs for the Employee Stock Ownership Plan if:

- The company explicitly states that shareholders' approval will be required for the board to grant stock options to individual members of the employee stock ownership plan pursuant to the Framework Act on Labor Welfare, either prior to the grant or retrospectively at the earliest general meeting; and
- The maximum dilution level under the program does not exceed 5 percent of issued capital for a mature company and 10 percent for a growth company.

Golden Parachute Clause

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to introduce a provision that entitles the company's directors to an excessive level of remuneration in the event that they are dismissed or terminated.

6. Routine / Miscellaneous

Diversification / Expansion of Business Objectives

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to expand business objectives unless the new business takes the company into risky areas.

Amend Quorum Requirements

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to amend quorum requirements. Vote against proposals to adopt a supermajority voting requirement for the removal of directors or internal auditors.

Authorizing Board to Approve Financial Statements and Income Allocation

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to introduce a provision that gives the board of directors the authority to approve financial statements and income allocation (including dividend payout). Insertion of such a clause would potentially take away shareholders' right to approve the company's dividend payment decision without any countervailing benefits.

7. Shareholder Proposals

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals that would improve the company's corporate governance or business profile at a reasonable cost.

Generally vote against proposals that potentially limit the company's business activities or capabilities or result in significant costs being incurred with little or no benefit.

8. Social and Environmental Issues

General Approach

ISS applies a common approach globally to evaluating social and environmental proposals which cover a wide range of topics, including consumer and product safety, environment and energy, labor standards and human rights, workplace and board diversity, and corporate political issues. While a variety of factors goes into each

analysis, the overall principle guiding all vote recommendations focuses on how the proposal may enhance or protect shareholder value in either the short or long term.

General Recommendation: Generally vote case-by-case, taking into consideration whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder value, and in addition the following will be considered:

- If the issues presented in the proposal are being appropriately or effectively dealt with through legislation or government regulation;
- If the company has already responded in an appropriate and sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;
- Whether the proposal's request is unduly burdensome (scope, timeframe, or cost) or overly prescriptive;
- The company's approach compared with any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;
- Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company's practices related to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;
- If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether or not reasonable and sufficient information is currently available to shareholders from the company or from other publicly available sources; and
- If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether or not implementation would reveal proprietary or confidential information that could place the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company's climate transition action plan ⁴, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:

- The extent to which the company's climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards;
- Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3);
- The completeness and rigor of company's short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant);
- Whether the company has sought and approved third-party approval that its targets are science-based;
- Whether the company has made a commitment to be "net zero" for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050;
- Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years;
- Whether the company's climate data has received third-party assurance;
- Disclosure of how the company's lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy;
- Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and
- The company's related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers.

Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition

⁴ Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan.

action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:

- The completeness and rigor of the company’s climate-related disclosure;
- The company’s actual GHG emissions performance;
- Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and
- Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive.

Change History

No.	Version	Description of changes	Date	Author
1	1.0	New Guideline	30/09/2024	H. Jung